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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the privatisation of the water industry in 1989, issues relating to the
pricing of water, charging structures and the conduct of the water regulators have
rarely been out of public attention. Water prices have increased ahead of
inflation, in some cases by more than 10 per cent per annum, profits have been
high, construction costs have fallen dramatically in the recession and the
investment requirements to meet EC Directives have been revised upwards.
In the first years following privatisation, the Director General (DG) of the
Office of Water Services (OFWAT), the economic regulator of the industry, has,
in the face of major shocks, used his discretion to intervene in the pricing and
investment arrangements repeatedly. Indeed, the shocks have been so large that
the DG has brought forward the review of the regulatory formula governing
prices from 1999–2000 to 1994–95. It is this review of the price limits (called
the Periodic Review) which is the subject of this paper.
The review will be far reaching, involving decisions about the appropriate
cost of capital for the industry, the valuation of existing assets, the capital
expenditures required to meet environmental quality targets, and the level of
operating costs and efficiency. To date, the DG has issued a series of
consultation papers, culminating in Setting Price Limits for Water and Sewerage
Services: The Framework and Approach to the 1994 Periodic Review, published
in November 1993, which details his approach to the Periodic Review. The aim
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of this paper is to examine the economic principles underlying the DG’s
approach and to consider the implications for the future of water regulation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II provides an overview of
the current regulatory regime, which was set up at privatisation. Section III
considers how the regulatory framework has developed since 1989, with
particular focus on the capital expenditure out-turn, shareholder returns and the
revisions to the process instigated by the DG. Section IV analyses the DG’s
approach to the Periodic Review and describes the ways in which pressure has
been brought to bear on the various components of the capital expenditure, cost
of capital, asset valuation and operating expenditure to reduce the rate of
increase in prices. Section V provides an assessment of the prospects for the
success of the DG’s approach. Finally, in Section VI, we summarise our main
conclusions.
II. THE ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF REGULATION IN THE
PRIVATISED WATER INDUSTRY
The conduct of regulatory policy in the water industry is inevitably influenced
both by the structure of institutions within the industry and by particular
characteristics that set the water industry apart from the other privatised
industries. These features are also likely to play a major role in the Periodic
Review.
1. The Privatisation Contract
In 1989, the Water Act was passed by Parliament, leading to the privatisation of
10 regional Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) and a number of Water
Only Companies (WOCs). The Act also described and created a variety of
regulatory institutions, discussed in more detail in subsection II(3).
The WASCs and WOCs contain significant elements of natural monopoly.
Operating efficiency, investment decisions and pricing are therefore not exposed
to the test of competition, and regulation, required to prevent the abuse of
monopoly, is likely to be a permanent feature of the industry (Cowan, 1993). In
the UK, utility regulation has focused on the setting of prices for fixed periods,
within the framework of licences granted to companies. These arrangements,
which have been followed in the water industry, can be viewed as creating
‘contracts’ between the privatised companies on the one hand, and customers,
represented by the regulator, on the other.
2 Within a legislative context, these
contracts have been termed Licences. The privately owned companies provide a
range of utility services, usually specified at the time of privatisation, and in
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return they receive the contract ‘fee’ which takes the form of a charge (the price
limit) for services levied on customers. The regulator (the DG) monitors the
Licences’ operation and — at the Periodic Review — revises the contracts. The
regulator can also propose changes in the Licence, though these can only be
enforced by agreement with the companies or by reference to the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission (MMC).
The economic attribute of the water industry that sets it apart from most of
the other privatised utilities, and which has been a preoccupation of the
regulators, is the high level of investment that is required for the provision of
improvements in the quality of water and sewerage services (OFWAT, 1993d).
During the early 1980s, spending on capital declined in the water industry as a
result of the general squeeze in public spending that occurred as part of the
Government’s wider economic policy. Consequently, by the end of the decade it
was necessary to invest heavily in the water industry just to maintain existing
standards (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
Capital Investment in the Water Industry,
1987–88 prices
Sources: 1983–84 to 1987–88 taken from CIPFA (1989); 1988–89 from OFWAT (1991b); 1989–90 based on


















In addition to infrastructure renewal, the first few years of privatisation have
also seen a rise in the level of quality-driven investment in the water industry due
to the imposition of more stringent environmental standards. Over the past two
decades, three major pieces of European Commission legislation have come into
force, establishing a new set of water quality standards (EC, 1976; EC, 1980;
EC, 1991) and a timetable of compliance for the Member States. The water
companies have consequently been required to carry out a general programme of
environmental improvement, necessitating additional capital expenditure. Thus,
unlike all other utility privatisations, every water company was obliged at
privatisation to produce formal expenditure plans for investment in underground
assets for the next ten years. These were known as the first asset management
plans (AMP1).
Over the period 1989–93, there has been a total of nearly £11 billion of
investment in the water industry in 1992–93 prices. Indeed, water industry
investment in 1992–93 accounted for 3 per cent of gross fixed capital formation
in England and Wales (OFWAT, 1993a). Early estimates of the level of
investment to be provided by the companies for the period 1995–2000 amount to
around £17 billion in 1993–94 prices (OFWAT, 1993b). One consequence,
therefore, of the privatisation of the water industry was that the water companies
had effectively taken over a large segment of capital expenditure which would
otherwise have fallen upon the Government.
The scale and nature of investment in the water industry give rise to a number
of issues that will continue to differentiate the future regulation of the industry
from that of most other utilities. These relate to the incentives of the privatised
companies, to the role of the regulator in determining, monitoring and changing
the new asset management plans (AMP2) and to the greater significance of the
duty placed on the regulator to ensure that the companies can finance their
functions, given the scale of borrowing required to finance the investments.
3
Whilst none of these issues represents differences in kind, they have necessitated
in a monopoly context a much more intrusive form of regulation from OFWAT
as compared with the other regulatory bodies, particularly OFTEL, OFFER and
OFGAS.
2. RPI + K Price Limits and Quality Regulation
In the water industry, the ‘contract fee’ was determined at privatisation by a
price control through the operation of a formula relating average changes in
prices to the retail price index (RPI). In most other utilities, this is known as RPI
–  X, but in the water industry, because prices were set to rise faster than
inflation, it was termed RPI + K. The average price increase that a company can
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make is limited to the percentage change in the RPI over the 12 months to the
November of the year before the charges apply, plus a factor K, where K is a
value set for each company for each year to reflect what the company needs to
charge to finance investments and provisions of service for its customers. The
average price controls apply to a weighted basket of five items for the water and
sewerage companies and three items for the water supply companies.
The K factors were originally devised by the Department of the Environment
in conjunction with the Welsh Office. Subsequent monitoring of the RPI + K
contract, including Interim Determinations (formal changes in K between
Periodic Reviews due to changes in pre-specified circumstances) and Periodic
Reviews, is the responsibility of the DG of OFWAT. It was widely envisaged at
initial K-setting that each company’s K factor would hold until the next Periodic
Review, which was expected to be in 10 years’ time, though provision was made
for a possible review after five years.
The rationale of the RPI + K price cap is that, once fixed, companies
maximise profits by minimising costs. At a future date, the price limit is revised
at a Periodic Review. However, provided the period is long enough and
regulators refrain from intervening between Periodic Reviews, the efficiency
incentives are likely to yield longer-term benefits to customers. Both operating
costs and capital expenditure would be lower than they would otherwise have
been under annual rate-of-return regulation (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989).
The nature of the investment component of the water regulatory contract
encouraged the Government to introduce at privatisation two significant
modifications to the conventional utility model. First, it was recognised at the
time of privatisation that finance for the substantial programme of investment in
the water industry would only be forthcoming if investors knew that they would
receive a rate of return on their investments that was comparable to the rate from
investment in similar types of projects. A guideline rate of return (7 per cent
real) was indicated, a positive K set
4 and the regulator given an explicit duty to
ensure the companies could finance their functions.
The second modification related to protection from shocks and was provided
through the Interim Determination mechanism. It was recognised at the time of
privatisation that long-term investment planning in the water industry was
subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty, relative to that in the other
utilities. One such source of uncertainty identified at privatisation was the
impact of future environmental legislation, and this was one of the reasons that a
cost-adjustment mechanism was built into the regulatory formula. Consequently,
the specific circumstances under which K factors could be adjusted in between
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Periodic Reviews, through formal Interim Determinations, were documented.
5
This mechanism can be interpreted as a cushion against shocks within the
contract framework. Though designed primarily with protection against higher
costs in mind, with one exception (South West Water) it has been used to claw
back the windfall construction costs bonus and hence excess profits, as we
discuss below.
3. The Institutional Framework
Environmental standards determine the dominant part of capital expenditure
from which part of the ‘contract fee’ is derived. However, the economic
regulation of the contract through OFWAT is separated institutionally from the
standard-setting, monitoring and enforcement of quality, even though there are
close links between the two types of regulation.
Environmental regulation is institutionally complex. It is ultimately the EC
that is responsible for the determination of large parts of the environmental
quality of water in the UK (Haigh, 1989). But although the Commission limits
the level of categories of pollutant that can be present in various water types, in
many cases there is no legislation detailing the method that Member States’
governments should use to control water pollution and so it is up to each country
whether they make greater use of pollution charges or direct regulation.
6 The
standards that are embodied in EC legislation form the basis for national
legislation approved by the British Parliament on water quality standards.
7
The responsibility for enforcing the quality standards laid out in the EC and
UK legislation falls upon a number of organisations. The principal organisation
in charge of controlling river pollution is the National Rivers Authority (NRA),
established under the 1989 Water Act. It is responsible for the issuing and
monitoring of consents,
8 and consequently the degree to which the NRA
enforces compliance will have significant effects upon water companies’ asset
management plans. The Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) is involved in the
regulation of household water and the implementation of the relevant EC
Directives. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP), established under
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the 1990 Environmental Protection Act, also has a limited role in water quality
regulation.
9
At the time of privatisation of the water industry, it was not made explicitly
clear how the two types of regulation would be co-ordinated, although there was
recognition that some degree of co-operation would be necessary. One view was
that the role of the economic regulator was merely to act as an intermediary,
passing on details of environmental standards determined by the EC, the NRA
and the Department of the Environment (DoE) to the water companies by means
of cost- pass-through in the asset management plans and Interim Determinations,
and, in consequence, the role was confined to implementing the required capital
expenditure at minimum cost. Another view was that an element of ‘regulatory
tension’ was implicit in the regulatory design and that the DG would involve
himself in the level as well as the delivery cost of capital expenditure.
III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1989 AND THE REGULATORY
RESPONSE
The RPI + K regime set up at privatisation, based on the concept of fixed-period
price limits, has not worked entirely as envisaged. Within a year of establishing
the K factors for each company, it quickly became apparent that the assumptions
upon which they had been set were, in practice, being undermined. to a degree
this was perhaps inevitable, since there is always likely to be a large forecasting
error associated with long-term investment plans. However, there were three
particular reasons why the scale of ex-post errors in AMP1 was particularly
large.
(i) The recession
The recession of the early 1990s hit the construction industry badly,
leading to a sharp fall in construction prices. Over the period 1987–88 to
1992–93 the construction output prices index fell 20 per cent relative to
the retail price index (OFWAT, 1993a). Given the scale of water
companies’ capital expenditure plans, this had the effect of significantly
reducing water companies’ costs so that the original K factors set in 1989
were now much higher than strictly required to finance AMP1.
(ii) Changing environmental standards
The downward pressure on construction costs was partially offset by the
growing importance attached to complying with EC environmental
standards. In particular, in 1991, the European Commission’s Urban Waste
Water Treatment Directive (UWWTD) came into force and this
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substantially increased the water companies’ environmental obligations,
over and above the provisions accounted for in AMP1.
(iii) Compliance timetables
The quality regulators added to the upward pressures on capital
expenditure by speeding up the timetable for compliance with quality
standards. They were well within their remit to do this since they were not
under any obligation to consider the implications of such actions upon the
pricing formula. In particular, the DoE and the Welsh Office announced in
1991 that water companies should accelerate their investment programmes
to comply with pesticide standards.
All three developments were largely unanticipated at privatisation. They
jointly called into question the levels of K that had been set by the DoE. The
assumptions that had provided the basis for the regulatory contract had been
undermined. On the one hand, the collapse in construction prices suggested that
there was some scope for revising each company’s K downwards; on the other,
the increase in capital expenditure above the original investment plans (shown in
Table 1) indicated that there was a case for revising K upwards.
Initially, no changes were made to the K factors. OFWAT adhered to the
fixed-period approach to the price contract in order to retain the efficiency
incentives and apparently took the view that the increased profits could be usedFiscal Studies
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to finance the extra capital expenditure. In effect, the shareholders took the risk
that the enforcement of environmental standards might tighten, in exchange for
windfall profits from the collapse of the construction industry. However, by
April 1992, the DG began to intervene directly on prices and the majority of
water companies had entered into ‘voluntary’ agreements to raise their tariffs by
less than the levels permitted under the pricing formula. Nevertheless, the
balance of the two effects — increased capital expenditure and falling
construction prices — still strongly favoured shareholders, as Figure 2 indicates.
Despite these ‘voluntary’ informal agreements and the increased costs arising
from increased environmental standards, average dividend payments rose by just
under 28 per cent over the period 1991–92 for the 10 water and sewerage
companies (Arthur Collins and Co., 1992).
FIGURE 2
Share Prices of the 10 Water and Sewerage Companies,
April 1991 to March 1993


















By October 1992, the DG decided upon more formal intervention in the
regulatory contract and initiated an Interim Determination. He announced a
reduction of K factors for 15 companies.
10 Contrary to the expectations of many
commentators at privatisation, but well within the terms of the Licence, the cost-
pass-through mechanism was used as a claw-back mechanism, reflecting the
changes in construction costs. Table 2 shows the extent to which K factors have
been amended for the 10 WASCs since privatisation.
Thus, despite the aim of the RPI + K framework to preserve price stability to
maximise the efficiency incentives, the first years of privatisation have witnessed
annual changes to the contract. The initial fixed-term regulatory contract has
become subject to annual intervention, first through changes in the contract
requirements and then through the cost-pass-through/cost-claw-back mechanism.
This experience has not been replicated in any other regulated utility.
IV. THE DG’S APPROACH TO THE PERIODIC REVIEW
In 1991, the DG announced that he would be resetting the price limits for the
WASCs and WOCs in the Periodic Review in July 1994. Although the Periodic
Review is essentially concerned with specifying the price limits for water and
sewerage charges that are to occur over the next 10 years, in practice the review
is much more wide ranging. As at the original K-setting, the appropriate levels of
prices will depend on the level of planned capital expenditure (which in turn will
depend upon the degree by which and speed with which the quality of drinking
water and sewerage effluent care are improved), the financial framework and the
size of operating expenditure.
1. The DG’s Objectives
In the discussions leading up to the Periodic Review, the DG has made
transparent what he wishes to achieve — ‘the stopping of the price escalator’
(OFWAT, 1993d). He has indicated that an appropriate longer-term average
level of K over the next 10 years is around 2 per cent or below.
11 This approach
marks a fundamental shift of emphasis from the way in which it was envisaged
that the regulatory regime would operate at privatisation. As discussed earlier, it
was originally believed that the quality regulators (DWI and NRA) would be
responsible (ultimately through the Secretary of State) for quality standards and
that, in response to these standards, the economic regulator would set prices to
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reflect these costs adequately, whilst at the same time ensuring that investors in
the water industry received a reasonable rate of return. However, an analysis of
the DG’s approach to the Periodic Review suggests that he has taken a much
more proactive role in determining the level of environmental expenditure. By
indicating what he believes customers can afford through a guideline level of K
ex ante, the DG has implicitly put a constraint on the level of investment and
consequently the level of environmental improvements that can occur over the
next 10 years.
In pursuing this strategy of bearing down on K, the DG has systematically
worked through all the key components that determine the revenue requirements
for the companies — capital expenditure, financial factors and operating
expenditures.
2. Controlling Capital Expenditure
Future levels of capital expenditure are central to the Periodic Review. The
water companies have drawn up a programme for investments in all assets over
the next 20 years, in the form of a second asset management plan, AMP2, which
was submitted as part of an overall Strategic Business Plan to OFWAT by the
end of March 1994. The DG will now take account of these investment plans
when setting the K factors. The aim of lowering K factors has required the DG to
take some rigorous measures to reduce AMP2, notably through customer
consultation and the so-called quadripartite discussions.
Customer Consultation and the Cost-of-Quality Exercise
In the run-up to the Periodic Review, the DG has stressed the importance of
customer consultation because it provides, in his view, a satisfactory way of
resolving the rising-quality/rising-bills trade-off. By encouraging customers to
reveal their preferences concerning the point at which the trade-off should occur,
the room for debate between the environmental and economic regulators relating
to the appropriate level of investment and the appropriate level of K is limited.
With a view to utilising customer consultation to provoke a debate on the
rising-quality/rising-bills trade-off, in 1992 OFWAT published The Cost of
Quality (OFWAT, 1992b), a paper that indicated the impact of introducing a
range of environmental improvements on the future level of household charges.
These environmental costs have subsequently been labelled as the Q element of
the price cap. In future the overall K will be set on the basis of a utility element
(X) and a quality element (Q). The DG also utilised other channels through
which customers could reveal their preferences. These included consultation
with the Customer Service Committees, established to represent water
customers’ views, and actively encouraging water companies to be moreFiscal Studies
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responsive to customer views on AMP2, through the publication of market
plans.F
12
The true preferences of customers will, however, only be revealed, and the
appropriate level of capital expenditure will only be established, if customers
have access to sufficient relevant information. One serious drawback of the cost-
of- quality exercise is that whilst the document is explicit on the costs associated
with various types of environmental improvements, even rudimentary
explanations relating to the possible health and environmental benefits are
conspicuously lacking. The scant references made about the possible expected
benefits are clothed in technical and scientific terms. Hence, when faced with a
choice between higher charges and no clear explanation of the benefits that may
arise on the one hand, and lower bills on the other, not surprisingly, few
customers expressed a preference for the former option. Thus, although The Cost
of Quality may have played a role in the politics of the debate between the
conflicting interests of OFWAT and the NRA, as a serious attempt to elicit
customer preferences it was flawed.
The Quadripartite Discussions
The second way in which the DG has sought to chisel away at AMP2 levels is
through the 1993 quadripartite discussions. These were discussions set up after
The Cost of Quality (and its successor, Paying for Quality (OFWAT, 1993b))
were published, involving the NRA, OFWAT, the water companies and the DoE.
It was intended that the talks would provide a channel through which the
problems of co-ordination between the environmental and economic regulations
could be addressed and the Secretary of State for the Environment, the ultimate
arbitrator,
13 could be informed of the differing views. It was also hoped that the
discussions would provide an answer to the problem of finding a clear
framework for policy decisions, taking into account the interactions between the
two types of regulators.
Two main results emerged out of the quadripartite discussions. First, it was
agreed that, in principle, major changes to environmental policy would be
implemented to coincide with the Periodic Reviews wherever possible, so that
the scope for subsequent Interim Determinations would be sharply reduced. In
practice, however, the DG admits that some uncertainty will remain (OFWAT,
1993d). Secondly, the Secretary of State for the Environment has also indicated
that it would be appropriate for water companies to drop existing obligations that
went further than the EC requirements. This substantially reduces the scale of
investment that was planned for in the original 10-year AMP1 over the period
1994–95 to 1999–2000.
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3. Controlling the Cost of Capital, Asset Valuation and Rates of Return
A second component to resetting K at the Periodic Review is the financial
framework.
14 The determination of K requires the establishment of a cost of
capital to be applied to the assets of each company, both existing at the time of
the review and to be created in the future through the agreed capital expenditure
in AMP2. The cost of capital (a weighted average of the cost of equity and the
cost of debt) was originally set at 7 per cent for WASCs and 8.5 per cent for
smaller WOCs. In trying to minimise K, the DG has attempted to lower this
figure for two reasons: to lower the required revenue to remunerate the existing
assets (including capital expenditure since privatisation); and to reduce the
incentive for companies to invest in additional capital expenditure. If the
permissible rate of return is greater than the actual cost of capital, then the
companies will be encouraged to maximise AMP2 and therefore to act as
environmental contractors. Clearly, the lower the permitted rate of return, the
less the incentive to promote high AMP2.
In estimating the cost of capital, OFWAT has considered two models — the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Dividend Growth Model (DGM).
In the first, the cost of equity is calculated as the sum of the rate of return for a
risk-free investment and a risk premium for the particular company relative to
the market risk. The second element, the risk premium, comprises the rate of
return on the market (the equity premium) multiplied by the beta coefficient for
the company, where the beta coefficient represents the risk to the investors’
portfolios of holding this stock. The Dividend Growth Model, on the other hand,
assumes that the cost of equity can be split into the dividend yield plus dividend
growth.
In the consultation document The Cost of Capital (OFWAT, 1991c), the DG
has stated a preference for the DGM since it focuses the attention of the
regulator on the key question of what the expected rate of dividend growth is. In
support of this view, he put forward the argument that the water industry is, in
many respects, a relatively low-risk industry, more akin to a bond rather than an
equity investment.
15 He contended that the regulatory framework was designed
to ensure that efficient companies would be able to secure a reasonable rate of
return on their investments; that water companies’ revenues under the present
form of unmeasured tariffs for most domestic customers were relatively stable
and certain; and that the structure of the pricing formula covered companies for
unexpected shocks through the Interim Determinations. Drawing all these
arguments together, and in the light of experience with the informal changes to K
levels which were then followed by the more formal Interim Determinations, the
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companies is likely to be regarded as an income stock with the return in the form of a steady yield, rather than
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DG has concluded that the cost of capital for new investments should be set
around 5–6 per cent (see OFWAT (1993d)). However, recognising that this is
significantly lower than the existing out-turn rate of return, he envisages that the
rate of return on existing assets will gradually converge to the 5–6 per cent level
over the next 10 years.
Determining the cost of capital does not, however, directly determine K even
if AMP2 is known. A further piece of the financial jigsaw is the value of existing
assets — both those inherited at privatisation and those created in the first period
up to 1994. In normal businesses, these are given at the current cost (CC)
valuation. However, CC values greatly exceed market values in the water
industry, and hence an alternative basis is required. In principle, there are two
broad approaches to resolving the asset valuation issue — to take the value at
privatisation, add subsequent capital expenditure and then roll forward at the
appropriate RPI and rate of return, or to take current market valuation.
16 In
Setting the Price Limits for Water and Sewerage Services (OFWAT, 1993d), the
DG has taken a modified version of the first approach, using the market value of
the WASCs based on share prices over the first 200 days of trading after
flotation as an indication of the initial value of water and sewerage companies.
This initial value will then be rolled forward to include the capital expenditure
since privatisation and RPI effects over the period. As a result, a regulatory asset
value will be established at the Periodic Review (the rate base) below the market
value. The difference between the two is explained by the fact that these existing
assets will be allowed to earn a return above 5–6 per cent for the next period,
converging only gradually over the period.
The final component in the financial determination of K is profiling — the
smoothing of K. Given that the capital expenditure is front-loaded in the 10-year
period, a smooth uniform K is achieved through increasing the gearing of the
companies. Currently, water companies’ gearing ratios are approximately 25 per
cent but there is clearly some scope for an increase in line with those of other
utilities and companies generally. If gearing ratios are increased to substantially
higher levels, then the K factors will be lower in the early part of the period and
higher thereafter. This could potentially have major implications for the water
industry as the year 2000 approaches. One obvious consequence of having high
gearing ratios is that changes in interest rates could have greater implications for
K.
4. Controlling Operating Expenditure
Having determined capital expenditure and the financial framework, it remains
to determine the revenue required to cover the operating costs of providing the
                                                                                                                                   
16 A third option is to roll forward the ‘indicative values’ which were set out by the Government to guide
investors at the time of privatisation. These issues were at the heart of the MMC inquiry into British Gas
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utility services. The DG has approached the problem of identifying the efficient
level of future costs through the comparison of efficiency between companies. A
major comparative efficiency exercise has been conducted.
17 The outcome of this
exercise will be reflected primarily in the X component of the new RPI – X + Q
formulas.
V. WILL A FIXED CONTRACT WORK?
At the heart of the DG’s approach to the Periodic Review is the belief that the
best way of achieving his objectives is to adhere as far as practically possible to
the fixed-period regulatory contract. Thus, in addition to exerting downward
pressure on K, he has sought to reduce the scope for ex-post adjustments. His
approach places great emphasis on simplicity: the companies are to be offered a
10-year contract, based upon an affordable price. The scope for Interim
Determinations has been reduced by restricting the terms under which
adjustments can take place — the RCC conditions — through ‘voluntary’
Licence changes. He has also attempted, through the quadripartite discussions, to
gain acceptance of the harmonisation of the quality regulators’ timetables with
Periodic Reviews. This approach to utility regulation has great merits: as noted
in Section II, it maximises efficiency incentives and it serves the shorter-term
needs of customers by minimising bills at the Periodic Review. However, as also
noted in Section II, the water industry differs markedly from other utilities in the
dominance of the capital expenditure issues driven by environmental, not
economic, regulation. Therefore, we need to address a practical question: will
the strategy of minimising K factors on affordability criteria and reducing the
scope for ex-post adjustment work? There are a number of reasons for believing
that it will not, which we address now.
1. Variance in AMP2
As witnessed in the first period, the error on ex-ante assumptions of investment
in the water industry is likely to be great. Whilst this was masked in the first
period by the averaging effect of rising capital expenditure requirements for
environmental reasons but falling construction costs, this outcome is unlikely to
be repeated. Indeed, the converse is more likely to be true as the construction
industry recovers from recession. Experience has also indicated that the pressure
to intervene in the face of shocks is also great. There is no reason to expect the
pressure for intervention after 1995 to be weaker.
However, rather than accepting that large investment programmes driven by
environmental regulation will inevitably be subject to exogenous shocks, and
providing a mechanism to adjust for this within the RPI – X + Q framework, the
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DG has reduced rather than increased the scope for Interim Determinations. This
strategy tightens the rigidity of the regulatory contract, but in doing so makes it
more likely that when shocks occur, the overall contract will break down. Of
course, it is never possible to specify in advance how every type of shock should
be accommodated but, nevertheless, retention (or possibly even expansion) of
the RCC conditions would bring about two clear benefits. First, it would provide
a formal channel through which water companies could shift from one optimal
investment path to another in response to shocks. Secondly, explicit rules would
reduce the scope for regulatory discretion. In the first period, the adjustments to
the contract preserved the system: if prices had not been reduced, political
intervention may have occurred. In the second period, the ability to
accommodate unanticipated shocks might prove equally useful.
2. Separate Environmental and Economic Regulation
The second reason for doubting the stability of the DG’s approach to the RPI–
X+Q framework relates to the inherent instability arising from the separate
institutional structures of environmental and economic regulation, discussed in
subsection II(3). Since regulatory functions are split between the NRA, DWI and
HMIP on the one hand, and OFWAT on the other, then, as we have already seen,
opposing forces are exerted on the level of K. Consequently, there exists a
problem of different objectives — maximising environmental quality whilst at
the same time minimising bills. This problem of conflicting objectives has been
a persistent feature of the first period since privatisation, and it will only be fully
resolved once some way of integrating the two regulatory activities is found.
There are a number of possible changes that could be made to the
institutional structure of water regulation that would perhaps make the
integration of environmental and economic regulation more feasible. One
possibility would be to amalgamate economic and environmental regulation with
the creation of a single umbrella regulatory body for the water industry.
Alternatively, given that the NRA is responsible for a wide range of activities,
including flood defence and the monitoring of other industrial and agricultural
polluters (approximately 50 per cent of the pollution load is attributable to the
water industry), a second possible solution could involve the handing over of
water company environmental regulation to OFWAT, so that the economic
regulator would issue its own form of consents to the industry, rather than the
NRA. With a single regulator, there would, perhaps, be more chance that the two
types of regulation would not be conducted in isolation from each other.
Administrative cost arguments would also suggest that this arrangement is not
without its merits. On a practical level, however, such radical institutional
reform would require careful consideration, since a number of pitfalls exist.
First, the creation of a single regulatory body would increase the possibility
of regulatory capture. Under existing arrangements, it could be argued that theWater Regulation
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economic regulator acts as a constraint on the environmental regulator and vice
versa. Secondly, it is possible that merely putting the two organisations under
one roof would not resolve the fundamental conflict. Thirdly, regulatory reform
in the water industry might be inappropriate at the present time given that the
Government is planning to subsume the NRA into a new Environment Agency
and so, given this uncertainty, it might be more appropriate to await the outcome
of this reform before deciding upon institutional solutions.
More immediately, however, other courses of action exist. Greater use, for
example, could be made of the new institutional mechanism, the quadripartite
process. This has, so far, been a temporary and not altogether satisfactory
arrangement, but this mechanism could be built upon in the future as a means of
resolving the problems of conflicting regulatory objectives.
Alternatively, an option that would involve a minimum of institutional
change is simply altering the legislative framework within which the NRA and
HMIP operate. A greater role for economic assessment of environmental
standards could be required within the BATNEEC framework (see Helm (1993)
and Pearce and Brisson (1993)).
The suggestions outlined here are by no means exhaustive, and are merely
intended to highlight some possible courses of action rather than provide
concrete solutions. However, in the absence of change, the OFWAT/NRA
tension is likely to trigger changes in capital expenditure between Periodic
Reviews and, given the reduced scope for Interim Determinations, these are
likely to put pressure on the stability of the new regulatory contract.
3. Commitment and Credibility
A final problem emerging for the fixed-period contract approach relates to the
issue of the credibility of the regulators. There are likely to be inefficiencies
arising from a situation where two parties are involved in an agreement of some
kind but one of the parties lacks credibility in that it is believed that it will
diverge from some prearranged course of action. This problem of commitment to
policies is likely to be a more significant feature of public than of private
agencies, because in the case of agreements between private individuals, there is
typically some arrangement in the legal system to deal with broken contracts.
Public organisations are, however, less likely to be restrained in this way.
18
It is possible that commitment and credibility issues are a problem for water
regulators. The experience of frequent interventions in the first period will serve
to weaken the credibility of the DG’s fixed-period contract in the second.
                                                                                                                                   
18 The problem of commitment in a dynamic regulatory framework was considered by Baron and Besanko
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our assessment of regulatory policy in the water industry suggests the following
conclusions. The regulatory regime established at privatisation, and represented
through the RPI + K pricing formula, had the characteristics of a quasi-fixed
contract, set within a regulatory structure where environmental and economic
regulation were separate. Whilst the fixed-period contract approach may be
suitable for the regulation of the utility services, it is less appropriate for the
capital-intensive water industry. The fixed nature of the regulatory contract,
within a framework of long-term investment planning, was always likely to be
subject to forecasting error. The regulatory regime is too rigid to cope with
random shocks that inevitably occur over a 20-year planning horizon. These
problems were further compounded by the separate structure of environmental
and economic regulation. Within a few years of the regulatory regime, the fixed-
term RPI + K pricing formula had in practice degenerated into annual
interventions to a degree not witnessed in other regulated utilities. This has
undermined its credibility.
Given the novelty of the privatisation regulatory regime, there were
inevitably going to be faults with the system. The Periodic Review provides an
opportunity to rectify these faults. However, an analysis of the DG’s approach
indicates that the outcome will, if anything, be even closer to a fixed-period
contract. The experience so far with this type of regulatory framework gives
considerable grounds for scepticism. A more likely outcome is repeated
interventions in the next period.
There are two major conclusions that arise from this analysis of the DG’s
approach to the Periodic Review. The first is that, whatever the theoretical
attractions of the RPI – X approach for conventional utilities, the fixed elements
in the water industry are unlikely to be sustained. Although the separation of X
and Q elements in the new formula recognises explicitly the special investment
characteristics of the water industry, the attempt to reinforce the rigidity of the
quality framework is unlikely to succeed in creating greater stability. It would
perhaps be better to focus on developing the Interim Determination mechanism,
to provide a more robust means for dealing with the shocks which occur between
Periodic Reviews.
The second main conclusion is that the split between environmental and
economic regulators is likely to increase costs and increase uncertainty. The
solution to the problem of institutional separation requires the establishment of
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